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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN AMERICAN UNIONS 
 
 
 
 Studying compensation in the nonprofit sector is difficult.  In nonprofit organizations, it is not 
always clear what the objectives of the organization are and, therefore, perhaps even more difficult to 
consider how to compensate managers than in the for-profit sector.  This paper investigates the 
determinants of executive compensation of leaders of American labor unions.  We use panel data on more 
than 75,000 organization-years of unions from 2000 to 2007.  We specifically concentrate on two issues 
of importance to unions – the level of membership and the wages of union members.  Both measures are 
strongly related to the compensation of the leaders of American labor unions, even after controlling for 
organization size and individual organization fixed-effects.  Additionally, the elasticity of pay with 
respect to membership for unions is very similar to the elasticity of pay with respect to employees in for-
profit firms over the same period.   
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I. Introduction and Motivation 
 
This paper investigates the determinants and structure of managerial pay of the leaders of 
American labor unions.  There has been considerable research into the determinants of executive 
compensation in for-profit companies in the United States (e.g. Murphy, 1985; Murphy 1999; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2006).  However, considerably less attention has been placed on 
compensation (and managerial compensation in particular) in nonprofit organizations.  Only 
recently have authors begun to investigate the compensation of managers in nonprofits (e.g. 
Oster, 1998; Hallock, 2002) and even made some comparisons between managerial pay in for-
profit and nonprofit organizations (Hallock, 2004).   
Studying managerial compensation in nonprofit organizations is particularly difficult since 
the goals and objectives of these organizations are less clear than they are in the for-profit sector.  
While many argue that for-profit companies are organized principally to create returns for 
shareholders, the objectives of nonprofits may differ quite dramatically.  One issue that comes 
out of previous research on compensation in nonprofits is the need to focus attention on 
particular industries within the nonprofit sector since the objectives of nonprofits may 
dramatically differ across industries (e.g. Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva, 2002 who study 
universities or Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould, 2005 who study hospitals).  Nursing homes is an 
example where a potentially important objective could be considered (Weisbrod and Schlesinger, 
1986).  Perhaps one would want to compensate a manager of a nursing home based on 
“trustworthiness”, but this is incredibly difficult to measure.  Other measures of performance in 
nonprofits include increased public awareness, cost savings, increased funding (Rocco, 1991), 
and customer satisfaction (Bailey and Risher, 1996).  It is clear from these examples that 
identifying appropriate measures for the goals and objectives of nonprofits is complicated.  
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The work reported in this paper is an attempt to carefully consider how the leaders of labor 
unions are paid in the United States.  Labor unions are particularly interesting because they 
represent a case where the objectives of the manager and the organization are, perhaps, better 
defined (and measurable) than in other nonprofit sectors.  Clearly, unions are interested in both 
the level of employment and the level of wages of their members (French, Hayashi, and Gray, 
1983)1.  As described below, we collect data on each and empirically determine their relative 
importance in a managerial compensation empirical specification.  This may be a way to 
consider an implicit objective function for the manager. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses some previous literature 
on the compensation of managers in nonprofits and in unions in particular.  Section III explores 
the collection and organization of the data.  Section IV reports the main empirical results and 
Section V offers some concluding comments.  We find that there is wide heterogeneity in how 
labor unions compensate their managers.  Further, the effect of union membership is large and 
significantly related to the compensation of the union President, with elasticities on the same 
order of magnitude as the elasticity of compensation to firm market value or the elasticity of 
compensation with respect to employees for publicly traded firms.  Similarly, the average wage 
of the rank and file union member is related to the pay of union presidents.  In the end, both 
union membership and wages of members are importantly related to the pay of union Presidents. 
 
 
II. Previous Work, Econometric Specification, and Issues 
 
 
Previous work has shown that one of the strongest correlates of managerial pay in American 
nonprofits (Hallock, 2002) and for-profit organizations (Lambert, Larker, and Weigelt, 1993; 
                                                 
1
 Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney (1995) consider union effectiveness in organizing. 
 5
Murphy, 1985) is the size of the organization.  Size is believed to have such a high correlation 
with manager’s pay because managers in larger organizations have responsibility for more 
resources and more people.  Although managers of nonprofits are paid considerably less than 
those in for-profit firms (Hallock, 2002; Preston, 1989), a great deal of this is explained by the 
size of the organization (measured for example by total assets).  However, for organizations of 
similar size, it has been found that non-equity-based compensation is not particularly different in 
nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms (Hallock, 2004)2.  In addition, Hansmann (1980; 
1996) and others outline that nonprofit organizations are not barred from making “profits”, but 
they are barred from distributing the excess funds to those in control of the organization.  
However, it is possible to compensate managers of nonprofits with incentive-based pay 
(Steinberg, 1990a; 1990b). “One way to minimize the probability that executives will take 
actions contrary to the organization’s goals is to tie their compensation to measures of their 
organization’s performance” (Ehrenberg and Goldberg, 1977, p. 188).  We investigate a variety 
of issues that have been hallmarks in the study of compensation of managers in for-profit firms 
including the elasticity of pay to firm size (Rosen, 1992) and the relationship between 
organization performance and managerial pay (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Tosi, Werner, Katz, 
and Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  As noted above, examining unions provides a unique view on the 
importance of organization performance, measured as wages of members and membership 
levels, to the compensation of the top union official.   
 A small set of previous studies have investigated the links between the compensation of 
union Presidents and certain union characteristics.  Each of the studies uses only cross sectional 
data.  We briefly mention six of them here.  Bressler (1972) examined the compensation of 97 
local union presidents in the construction industry in 1967 by regressing annual compensation of 
                                                 
2
 At the same time, equity compensation in for-profit firms is often an important fraction of total compensation. 
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the top official on membership size, total net worth of membership, and the hourly wage rate of 
workers.  He found that all were significantly associated with compensation at the 0.01 
confidence level, and concluded that “union officials are not unaffected by the agreements they 
negotiate” (pg. 49).  Ehrenberg and Goldberg (1977) investigated the performance and 
compensation of the 670 heads of building trade unions in 1971.  They found that the salary of a 
local business agent of a union is related to the “ability to pay” (defined as total dues and total 
assets) and to his own bargaining performance (measured by absolute level of wages and relative 
wages compared to wages in and outside their craft).  Sandver (1978) examined 100 large local 
unions using data from 1962, 1967 and 1973.  He found, among other results, that membership 
was significantly related to the compensation of the head of the unions he examined.  Sandver 
and Heneman (1980) studied the relationship among the top three highest paid officials in the 
100 largest national unions in 1962, 1967 and 1973.  Among their findings is that there was a 
stable relationship (over time) between the pay of the top officer and the second two officers, 
similar to that found in for-profit companies.  French, Hayashi and Gray (1983), using data from 
1978, showed a relationship between union head’s compensation and measures of union 
financial strength, job complexity (measured with the variables: number of locals, functional 
specialization of administration, industrial diversity of membership, and geographical dispersion 
of membership), and tenure in the job.  Finally, French (1992) investigated the relationship 
between power and pay of 136 international unions in 1977 and 108 international unions in 1987.  
French defined power in his analysis by the procedures and structures used by unions to elect its 
officers.  More autocratic structures (indicated by longer presidential terms of office, longer 
intervals between conventions, the election of presidents at conventions, and the election of the 
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board on an at-large basis) were argued to create more power for union presidents.  French found 
support for the hypothesis that power and pay were positively related.   
As previously noted, none of the previous studies on the compensation of union Presidents 
made use of panel data.  On the other hand, we investigated a panel of eight years, from 2000 
through 2007.  Therefore, one of the issues not addressed in previous studies, that of unmeasured 
heterogeneity of the organizations themselves, can be addressed in our work.   
Our main empirical specification considers the determinants of compensation of the 
President of the union as follows:   
  
lnPit = β ln M it + γ lnW it + θ ln Ait + α i + εit  (1) 
where P is the total compensation of the President of the labor union, M is total membership in 
the labor union, W is the average wage of union members3 (defined below), A is the total assets 
of the labor unions, i indexes unions, t indexes time, and (α i + εit ) is the composite error term 
containing possible permanent effects. No doubt, average total compensation of the members 
(including pensions, benefits etc.) would be a better measure than W.  However, we do not have 
access to such data and assume that pensions and benefits are highly correlated with the wage in 
these organizations. 
Clearly, however, the set of organization characteristics does not fully explain the 
relationship between compensation and membership and member wages (see the R2 values in the 
OLS specifications below), and therefore, in some specifications, we have chosen to allow for 
the possibility that other characteristics of the Presidents and the unions which have not been 
included thus far in previous research are confounding our investigation of the link among these 
key variables. 
                                                 
3
 A more complicated specification may replace the average wage of union members with the union wage relative to 
the non-union wage.  We do not explore that in this paper. 
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To help remedy this problem, we make use of the benefits of the panel data.  We can 
assume that the source of the endogeneity arises only through the permanent component of the 
error term, iα , and not through the transitory component, itε , then the standard fixed-effects 
estimation of equation (1) will yield consistent estimates of the parameters.   
 
 
III. Data 
 
The data for this paper come from LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 reports filed by each labor 
organization from 2000 – 2007 (inclusive)4 that is subject to the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), and the Foreign Service 
Act (FSA).  The forms disclose a common set of information for all labor unions.  Individual 
data include information such as liabilities, loans, mortgages, dividends, rents, gifts and grants, 
investments, members of the unions, total dues paid, and compensation of the president5.  We 
focus on only a sub-set of the information in the LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 forms.  In all, we study 
75,717 organization-years of data for 15,942 unique organizations. 
 We also categorize labor unions as “International”, “Intermediate” or “Local” based on 
the United States Department of Labor Office of Labor-Management Standards’ classification.  
Much of the analysis below will be done separately for each of these three categories of labor 
unions. 
 We begin by considering summary statistics for only international unions in Table 1a.  It 
is clear from the table that the average (nominal) union president compensation over time in 
these data is $141,859, with a median of $112,235.  Figure 1 shows that this average increased 
                                                 
4
 LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 data are actually available back to 1959 (the date of the passage of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act) on microfilm.  We are in beginning stages of collecting data from years prior to 2000. 
5
 It may be possible that the president of a specific union in our data also receives pay from another source (or 
union).  Our data are unable to detect this.   
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considerably over time (from $111,211 in 2000 to $213,391 in 2007).  The average international 
union had 108,848 members.  The median number of members is much smaller (11,642) due to 
the fact that some of the international unions are so large.  The average level of assets for the 
international unions over this time is $36.4 million and the total annual dues is $17.3 million.  
We also created an estimate of the average union member wage, 
 W = (D/0.015)/M, (2) 
where D = total annual dues of the union, M is the total union’s membership, and we assume that 
1.5% of the union member’s pay is contributed to the labor union as dues.6  Using the formula in 
equation (2), we computed that the average member of an international labor union during this 
time earned $42,111.  Tables 1b and 1c report summary statistics for intermediate and local labor 
unions, respectively.  There are clearly substantially more intermediate union-years of data in our 
intermediate sample (3,934) than international (362).  There are still more local (71,397).  The 
tables clearly show that local unions pay their presidents substantially less than and are smaller 
than (in terms of assets and membership) intermediate unions, which are substantially smaller 
than international unions.  However, the estimate for the average wage of intermediate union 
members is substantially higher than the average member wage of locals and internationals. As 
noted above, this number is an estimate, and the anomaly comes from the fact that there are 
small numbers for members in the intermediate unions.   
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
As is clear from equation (1) we are interested in testing whether membership and average 
wages of members are two primary goals of labor unions. If the union wants to align the interests 
                                                 
6
 See Rasian (1983) for further discussion of the appropriateness of the assumption that union members pay, on 
average, between 1.13% and 1.6% of their wages in union dues. 
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of its leader with that of its membership, then it seems reasonable that these two measures would 
be related to the pay of the head of the union.  In addition, we include a measure of firm size 
(total assets) as this may represent a firm’s ability to increase membership and wages. 
To begin, consider Figure 2, which plots the natural logarithm of the President salary against 
the natural logarithm of the membership, by year.  Visually, there appears to be a positive 
relationship between the two.  This is true whether we examine internationals (Figure 2a), 
intermediates (Figure 2b), or locals (Figure 2c).  Another measure of organization scale or 
success could be assets.  Figure 3 (organized similar to Figure 2) plots the relationship between 
the natural logarithm of pay of the union Presidents against the natural logarithm of the assets in 
his or her organization in international unions (Figure 3a), in intermediate unions (Figure 3b), 
and local unions (Figure 3c).  Figure 4 plots the natural logarithm of the unions President’s pay 
against the estimated average union member wage as computed in equation (2).  It is clear from 
Figure 4 that the relationship between the President pay and the estimated average wage of the 
members is less positive than the relationship between union President pay and union 
membership or between union President pay and union assets. 
Table 2 displays results from specifications like that of equation (1) for only international 
unions.  In column (1) we regress the natural log of President compensation on the natural log of 
membership and estimate a large and significant elasticity of 0.338.  Column (2) repeats this 
exercise using the natural log of the estimated average union member wage as the independent 
variable.  The estimated coefficient is much smaller (0.106) but also statistically significantly 
different from zero.  In column (3) we do the analysis again only controlling for the natural log 
of assets.  The estimated elasticity is 0.394 and statistically significantly different from zero.  
Columns (4) – (7) investigate various combinations of these covariates and include year effects 
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(in column 7).  Column (7) suggests that all three independent variables (ln(membership), 
ln(estimated average wage) and ln(assets)) are significantly related to the compensation of the 
union President.   The R2 = 0.623 suggests that quite a large fraction of the variation in the pay of 
the union head is explained by variation in the independent variables, and quite a bit more than in 
a typical study of for-profit CEO compensation (Murphy, 1999).    
A virtue of our data, however, is that we have multiple observations (up to eight each) on the 
compensation of the President and union characteristics for each union in sample.  Column (8) of 
Table 2 uses this information and controls for organization fixed-effects in the specification of 
international union president compensation.  This produces some interesting results.  Even 
controlling for organization fixed-effects, there is a positive relationship between international 
President wages and membership and president wages and estimated average worker wages, and 
both are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
Table 3 repeats the analysis of Table 2 but investigates the compensation of leaders of 
intermediate unions, rather than international unions.  Again, membership, estimated average 
worker wage and assets are all unconditionally related to the pay of the head of the intermediate 
union.  However, when we control for individual organization fixed effects (in column 8), the 
relationship between President pay and membership is positive and significant (estimated 
elasticity of 0.166) and the relationship between President pay and estimated average worker pay 
is positive and significant (estimated elasticity of 0.180).  These two elasticities are both 
significantly different from zero and are statistically indistinguishable from one another. 
 Table 4 repeats the analysis for the local unions – the group for which we have 
overwhelmingly more data.  Throughout the table, the estimated coefficients are larger than they 
are in each of the previous tables.  When we look within organizations in column (8) of Table 4, 
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we see that the elasticity of President compensation with respect to membership is 0.361 and the 
elasticity of President pay with respect to the estimated worker wage is 0.282.  Both of these 
elasticities are significantly different from zero.    
 In summary, there seems to be a large and positive relationship between the 
compensation of the heads of American labor unions and the number of members they have in 
their union and the estimated average wage of those members.  Both variables matter. 
 
V. Concluding Comments 
 
A significant body of literature exists on the compensation of managers of firms in the 
United States (Murphy, 1999), with more recent research conducted on the compensation of 
managers in nonprofit organizations (Hallock, 2002). However, only a small number of studies 
have investigated the determinants of pay of top union officials, none examining these 
determinants longitudinally.  We hope this is a useful step in understanding the compensation of 
the presidents of American labor unions over time.  
The argument for the link between executive pay and organizational performance is clear: 
because executives are in change of the success of the organization, part of their pay should be 
contingent on how well the organizations does (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  Similar to for-profit 
firms, it appears that the pay of union Presidents is tied to the performance of the organization he 
or she leads.  We find that the pay level of top union officials is strongly correlated with the 
number of members within the union and the estimated wage for those members.  Further, we 
find these results in all three types of unions (international, intermediate, and local), and find 
these variables are significant when controlling for firm size (with the variable total assets), and 
even when controlling for organization (with organization fixed-effects). It appears that within 
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unions, as the number of members and average member pay increases, the top union official’s 
pay also increases.  The results of our analysis are aligned with past studies conducted with cross 
sectional data on the compensation of local union officers (Bressler, 1972; Ehrenberg and 
Goldberg, 1977; Sandver, 1978), and national union officers (French et al., 1983; French, 1992; 
Sandver and Heneman, 1980).   
The emergence of paid full-time union officials continues to be the subject of considerable 
debate (French, 1992).  Some analysts have argued that this development in labor unions ensures 
that the rewards of union leaders are tied to the membership’s goals (French, 1992; Kochan, 
1980).  Bok and Dunlop (1970) assert that replacing voluntary leaders with salaried officers has 
enhanced the effectiveness of collective bargaining and therefore advanced the interests of union 
members.  These authors state: “Union members have doubtless suffered far more from 
inefficient and unimaginative administration than they have ever lost through corruption and 
undemocratic processes” (pg. 90).  Whereas others, suggested in the quote above, have argued 
that the transition to full-time paid leadership may reduce the responsiveness of officials to 
interests of union members and has led to a decline in democratic practices within unions 
(French et al., 1983; Lipset, 1970).  These analysts believe that the compensation of union 
officials is related to their control over the rank-and-file (French, 1992).  The results of our study 
shed some light on this debate.  Our findings suggest that the pay of the union President is 
significantly related to at least some measures of the performance of the union.  In particular, the 
size of the membership and the average wage of members, are both positive and significantly 
related to the compensation of the union President.  Therefore, it appears the “administrative 
rationalization”, defined as “the making of union decisions through rules, organization and 
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expertness rather than through trial by struggle, ideology and hit-or-miss” (Barbash, 1969, p. 
147), may have led to the betterment of the rank-and-file.   
Although the results of this study provide strong evidence that the compensation of union 
Presidents is linked to performance of the union, the findings and interpretations from this study 
must remain tentative.  For example, a number of other factors important to the rank-and-file, 
such as benefits of members, relative wage of members, number of strikes, number of layoffs, 
etc., might influence the salaries of union presidents and have not been included in the present 
study.   
Very little is known regarding the pay of union presidents.  We hope the findings from this 
study enhance what we know about compensation in nonprofits and motivate further research in 
this area.   
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Table 1a. International. Summary Statistics 
 
 All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
President 
Compensation 
 
141859 
(137816) 
[112235] 
 
111211 
(89529) 
[100629] 
124185 
(106675) 
[106300] 
130152 
(111803) 
[109657] 
140557 
(118382) 
[117611] 
145211 
(126779) 
[114572] 
183822 
(151521) 
[131629] 
198270 
(268800) 
[122927] 
213391 
(161828) 
[175592] 
Members 
 
 
108848 
(361274) 
[11642] 
 
118496 
(370923) 
[8130] 
118439 
(382702) 
[11894] 
110712 
(1358391) 
[11540] 
63771 
(127843) 
[11750] 
99380 
(347853) 
[10782] 
183745 
(595487) 
[23205] 
 
134966 
(496932) 
[13847] 
114119 
(205867) 
[18519] 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
 
42111 
(154831) 
[14270] 
 
36318 
(143783) 
[12395] 
39636 
(159392) 
[12747] 
39430 
(142516) 
[14168] 
38075 
(131220) 
[15448] 
36687 
(122368) 
[15255] 
24045 
(34302) 
[15696] 
94631 
(297679) 
[18277] 
32472 
(25097) 
[19160] 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
 
36400 
(81800) 
[4294] 
 
32600 
(70000) 
[2405] 
 
33700 
(71500) 
[3856] 
33500 
(71500) 
[5238] 
32400 
(73100) 
[3960] 
35500 
(78900) 
[4216] 
45400 
(107000) 
[10300] 
39000 
(96500) 
[5022] 
118000 
(206000) 
[49300] 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
 
17300 
(45100) 
[2180] 
 
16200 
(42800) 
[1761] 
17300 
(45900) 
[2191] 
17500 
(44700) 
[2545] 
13100 
(30600) 
[2583] 
17000 
(44600) 
[2386] 
26200 
(68900) 
[4162] 
19500 
(56800) 
[1799] 
31300 
(48800) 
[10400] 
N 362 53 55 62 66 66 21 32 7 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Medians in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M = (total annual union dues / 0.015) / total union membership 
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Table 1b. Intermediate. Summary Statistics 
 
 All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
President 
Compensation 
 
64270 
(175730) 
[55485] 
 
49512 
(43033) 
[47851] 
 
58140 
(130421) 
[54477] 
68777 
(187233) 
[56767] 
76092 
(319119) 
[56601] 
62791 
(57551) 
[60648] 
66240 
(166461) 
[42164] 
71056 
(145642) 
[53076] 
52363 
(52363) 
[49915] 
Members 
 
 
6987 
(27366) 
[1894] 
 
6140 
(22026) 
[1873] 
5988 
(19470) 
[1905] 
7521 
(28725) 
[2012] 
7482 
(29472) 
[1950] 
7710 
(31627) 
[1912] 
6917 
(33043) 
[1489] 
 
7426 
(30397) 
[1726] 
4934 
(8853) 
[1712] 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
 
153966 
(1200376) 
[11702] 
 
159832 
(1564272) 
[10345] 
158378 
(1340950) 
[11991] 
126585 
(877089) 
[11629] 
148768 
(990140) 
[11146] 
172960 
(1366815) 
[11958] 
96264 
(560751) 
[13132] 
195416 
(1293656) 
[13778] 
159988 
(733777) 
[12059] 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
 
2021 
(7723) 
[130] 
 
1285 
(3981) 
[105] 
 
1476 
(4399) 
[139] 
1843 
(6667) 
[147] 
2065 
(7989) 
[136] 
2215 
(8456) 
[149] 
2742 
(10600) 
[98] 
3076 
(11100) 
[113] 
2783 
(11500) 
[165] 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
 
1408 
(5119) 
[179] 
 
941 
(2850) 
[162] 
1064 
(3109) 
[183] 
1363 
(4656) 
[186] 
1424 
(5062) 
[185] 
1581 
(5693) 
[204] 
1764 
(6659) 
[145] 
2024 
(7650) 
[164] 
1682 
(6250) 
[198] 
N 3934 540 629 656 673 661 253 407 115 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Medians in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M 
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Table 1c. Local. Summary Statistics 
 
 All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
President 
Compensation 
 
26837 
(51552) 
[6052] 
 
22688 
(36801) 
[5298] 
 
25530 
(42121) 
[5999] 
27283 
(44649) 
[6528] 
28466 
(51853) 
[6591] 
29161 
(50176) 
[6674] 
22116 
(68370) 
[4800] 
29697 
(62114) 
[6217] 
33511 
(122509) 
[8829] 
Members 
 
 
865 
(4054) 
[235] 
 
799 
(3106) 
[235] 
912 
(4337) 
[241] 
928 
(4481) 
[243] 
907 
(4026) 
[241] 
940 
(4458) 
[242] 
600 
(4738) 
[182] 
 
745 
(2834) 
[230] 
837 
(3176) 
[254] 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
 
35226 
(316499) 
[21465] 
 
29216 
(82143) 
[19567] 
30228 
(57159) 
[20637] 
33568 
(199482) 
[21513] 
37578 
(401473) 
[22271] 
39085 
(397678) 
[22713] 
42854 
(609844) 
[21037] 
38280 
(322593) 
[22830] 
46891 
(522586) 
[23607] 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
 
558 
(3106) 
[62] 
 
415 
(2017) 
[52] 
 
509 
(2398) 
[61] 
569 
(2994) 
[66] 
579 
(2770) 
[67] 
628 
(3304) 
[67] 
518 
(3848) 
[50] 
629 
(3675) 
[70] 
982 
(8092) 
[98] 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
 
379 
(1670) 
[75] 
 
310 
(1209) 
[70] 
371 
(1583) 
[76] 
392 
(1601) 
[78] 
407 
(1731) 
[79] 
441 
(2043) 
[81] 
275 
(2047) 
[58] 
369 
(1338) 
[76] 
449 
(1996) 
[84] 
N 71397 10847 11782 12210 12273 11937 4386 6612 1350 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Medians in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M 
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Table 2. International. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
 
 Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
    * p-value < .10  
  ** p-value < .05 
*** p-value < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(membership) 0.338*** 
(0.023) 
 
  0.017 
(0.029) 
 0.099*** 
(0.033) 
0.100*** 
(0.033) 
0.204** 
(0.095) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
 
 
 
0.106*** 
(0.034) 
  0.081*** 
(0.021) 
0.121*** 
(0.025) 
0.123*** 
(0.025) 
0.068** 
(0.028) 
Ln(assets)  
 
 
 0.394*** 
(0.017) 
0.382*** 
(0.026) 
0.391*** 
(0.016) 
0.320*** 
(0.028) 
0.320*** 
(0.029) 
- 0.045 
(0.046) 
Year effects no 
 
no no no no no yes yes 
Org effects no no no no no no no yes 
         
Constant 8.160*** 
(0.222) 
 
10.328*** 
(0.325) 
5.372*** 
(0.256) 
5.393*** 
(0.259) 
4.665*** 
(0.313) 
4.449*** 
(0.317) 
4.477*** 
(0.366) 
9.613*** 
(1.107) 
Adj. R2 0.371 0.023 0.605 0.604 0.619 0.628 0.623 0.954 
N 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 
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Table 3. Intermediate. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
 
 Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(membership) 0.285*** 
(0.012) 
 
  0.015 
(0.011) 
 0.479*** 
(0.016) 
0.478*** 
(0.016) 
0.166*** 
(0.024) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
 
 
 
0.308*** 
(0.012) 
  0.183*** 
(0.010) 
0.518*** 
(0.014) 
0.517*** 
(0.014) 
0.180*** 
(0.019) 
Ln(assets)  
 
 
 0.440*** 
(0.008) 
0.434*** 
(0.010) 
0.398*** 
(0.008) 
0.096*** 
(0.013) 
0.096*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.013 
(0.015) 
Year effects no 
 
no no no no no yes yes 
Org effects no no no no no no no yes 
         
Constant 8.150*** 
(0.088) 
 
7.392*** 
(0.110) 
4.935*** 
(0.102) 
4.911*** 
(0.104) 
3.772*** 
(0.115) 
0.853*** 
(0.144) 
0.683*** 
(0.173) 
7.556*** 
(0.347) 
Adj. R2 0.130 0.150 0.416 0.416 0.464 0.562 0.562 0.930 
N 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 
 
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
     * p-value < .10  
   ** p-value < .05 
 *** p-value < .01 
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Table 4. Local. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
 
Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
    * p-value < .10  
  ** p-value < .05 
*** p-value < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(membership) 0.897*** 
(0.003) 
 
  0.523*** 
(0.004) 
 0.686*** 
(0.004) 
0.688*** 
(0.004) 
0.361*** 
(0.007) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
 
 
 
0.647*** 
(0.007) 
  0.347*** 
(0.005) 
0.584*** 
(0.005) 
0.583*** 
(0.005) 
0.282*** 
(0.006) 
Ln(assets)  
 
 
 0.633*** 
(0.002) 
0.356*** 
(0.003) 
0.600*** 
(0.002) 
0.215*** 
(0.003) 
0.213*** 
(0.003) 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
Year effects no 
 
no no no no no yes yes 
Org effects no no no no no no no yes 
         
Constant 3.989*** 
(0.019) 
 
2.543*** 
(0.072) 
1.889*** 
(0.026) 
2.080*** 
(0.024) 
-1.214*** 
(0.054) 
-3.079*** 
(0.047) 
-3.018*** 
(0.055) 
4.599*** 
(0.085) 
Adj. R2 0.520 0.101 0.514 0.592 0.542 0.663 0.664 0.942 
N 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 
